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Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze how dignity and vulnerability, as declared principles of
bioethics, both can be seen in a new light when they are thought of together, in their intertwining, in
order to outline a proposal for an analytical framework for end-of-life care. It is thus shown, on the
one hand, that the demand for respect for the equal dignity of every person, linked by the different
anthropological and ethical theories to their autonomy as a rational agent, also refers to their fragile,
vulnerable, and interdependent character, as an embodied subjectivity, sustained by a complex web of
care. On the other hand, the vulnerability of these selves as others, constituted by the radical appeal
of everything that affects them socially, emotionally, sensitively, and by their need for recognition and
attention, would be pathological if it did not include the impulse towards autonomy, which, although
precarious and connotative, requires dignified and equitable treatment. This intertwining of both
principles points to a phenomenological conception of the person as a corporeal social existence, from
which a number of studies on the attention to dignity and vulnerability at the end of life are analyzed.
Keywords: bioethics; ethical principles; autonomy; dignity; vulnerability; corporeality; responsive-
ness; end-of-life care
1. Introduction
The aim of this study is to present dignity and vulnerability as two fundamental
ethical principles of care at the end of life, which acquire full meaning when they are
thought of together, showing their intertwining. Firstly, the presence, latent or express, of
both principles is examined in various bioethical documents of international importance,
from the influential Belmont Report in the United States to the UNESCO Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights. Next, on one hand, the study proposes that the recognition
of vulnerability is already implicit in the demand for respect for dignity, linked by the
philosophical tradition to the rational autonomy of the person (from stoicism, passing
through the humanism of Pico della Mirandola, to the enlightened ethics of Immanuel Kant)
since it does not deal with a sovereign or autarkic subject but rather fragile, vulnerable,
and interdependent beings who are in need of care. On the other hand, it also shows
how vulnerability, as a dimension of the human condition and of a self constituted by the
appeal of otherness (E. Levinas), can only be understood as an ethical principle, as due to
their precariousness fragile existences feel driven to realize themselves as co-protagonist
agents of their lives, aware of the dignity of their own value (P. Ricoeur). From this double
perspective, of a vulnerable dignity and dignified vulnerability, the study points to a
responsive phenomenological conception of the person as an intercorporeally situated
social and corporeal existence (M. Merleau-Ponty, B. Waldenfels), whose importance as a
theoretical framework to investigate the care at the end of life is shown through the analysis,
by way of example, of certain studies on the perception of dignity and vulnerability by
health personnel, patients, or family members in health care contexts.
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2. Dignity and Vulnerability in the Declarations of the Principles of Bioethics
In the late 1970s, the findings of The National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research were released in the form of a statement of
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, better
known as the Belmont Report [1,2]. In this document, both dignity and vulnerability are
present, more the former than the latter, although neither of the two is expressly mentioned.
Dignity appears associated with the principle that the declaration initially states as
“respect for persons”, later called the principle of autonomy, and which, according to the
Belmont Report, “incorporates at least two ethical convictions: first, that individuals should
be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that persons with diminished autonomy are
entitled to protection”. In other words, this principle of respect for people as autonomous
beings leads to differentiate “two separate moral requirements: the requirement to ac-
knowledge autonomy and the requirement to protect those with diminished autonomy”.
Thus, of the two ethical convictions brought together in this principle, the first connects
with the dignity of people through the recognition of their autonomy, and the second with
the attention to or care for vulnerability due to the requirement for protection of those
who they may find their capacity for self-determination diminished. So, as this declaration
understands that “[a]n autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about
personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation”, it follows that
“[t]o respect autonomy is to give weight to autonomous persons’ considered opinions and
choices while refraining from obstructing their actions unless they are clearly detrimental
to others”. Thus, put in negative terms, “[t]o show lack of respect for an autonomous agent
is to repudiate that person’s considered judgments, to deny an individual the freedom
to act on those considered judgments, or to withhold information necessary to make a
considered judgment, when there are no compelling reasons to do so.” Consequently,
vulnerability significantly also appears implicit at the very heart of this principle of respect
for the dignity of persons, in the form of limitations to the exercise of autonomy, here
called self-determination, found by people who are still in the process of maturing, or
when “some individuals lose this capacity wholly or in part because of illness, mental
disability, or circumstances that severely restrict liberty” [1,2]. One can see in this demand
of the Belmont Report for extra protection for dignity in certain situations, a first indication
of the future inclusion of vulnerability among the principles of bioethics. In some ways,
a connection with vulnerability can also be seen in the other principles declared by the
Belmont Report: non-maleficence, beneficence and justice, [3,4] (p. 19).
Vulnerability was specifically mentioned in the so-called Barcelona Declaration (1998),
bringing together the concerns of the Belmont Report: “Vulnerability expresses two basic
ideas. (a) It expresses the finitude and fragility of life which, in those capable of autonomy,
grounds the possibility and necessity for all morality. (b) Vulnerability is the object of a
moral principle requiring care for the vulnerable. The vulnerable are those whose autonomy
or dignity or integrity is capable of being threatened” [5,6].
More recently, right at the beginning of the 21st century, the BIOMED II Project
put forward a proposal for bioethical principles at the European level, the Basic Ethical
Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw [7,8], in which dignity and vulnerability
already appear along with autonomy and integrity expressly mentioned as two of the four
basic ethical principles.
Likewise, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, from UNESCO
(19 October 2005) also explicitly includes them among the principles that it lists as “Dignity
and human rights” (in Article 3) and “Respect for human vulnerability and personal
integrity” (in Article 8). Respect for dignity is linked to respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, indicating the priority of the interests and well-being of people
over the exclusive interests of science and society. In terms of vulnerability, reference
is made to the application and promotion of scientific knowledge, medical practice and
related technologies, and expressly refers to the protection of particularly vulnerable
individuals and groups, as well as respect for the personal integrity of the former.
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3. Dignified and Autonomous in Vulnerability
Dignity and autonomy are grouped together and are closely related in the Barcelona
Declaration. Five aspects of autonomy are proposed: (1) capacity of creation of ideas and
goals for life; (2) capacity of moral insight, “self-legislation”, and privacy; (3) capacity
of decision and action with lack of outer constraint; (4) capacity of political involvement
and personal responsibility; and (5) capacity of informed consent. Autonomy is linked to
vulnerability when it is pointed out that “autonomy remains merely an ideal because of
the structural limitations given to it by human weakness and dependence on biological,
material and social conditions, lack of information for reasoning etc.” [5,7] (p. 25).
Dignity, in turn, appears in the Declaration of Barcelona, with its own characteristics,
which are not reduced to autonomy. “Although originally a virtue of outstanding persons
and a virtue of self-control in healthy life qualities, which can be lost, for instance by lack
of responsibility or in extreme illness it has been universalized as a quality of the person as
such. It now refers to both the intrinsic value of the individual and the inter-subjective value
of every human being in its encounter with the other. Dignity concerns both oneself and the
other: I must behave with dignity, and I must consider the dignity of the other; I must not
give up civilised and responsible behaviour, and the other should not be commercialised
and/or enslaved” [5,7].
At a certain point, the discussion about dignity began to see it as a bombastic and
empty term that would not in any concrete way help to make decisions from the ethical
and legal point of view in biomedical and health practice [9]. However, this is really a
discussion which is the result of a lack of differentiation between two uses of the concept
of dignity. On the one hand, the importance of dignity as a policy principle stands out
when it is considered from the distinction between principles and rules; on the other hand,
dignity is shown as a moral standard of the quality of health care. It is here where the link
with vulnerability appears again as it is precisely in the situation of patients, as the word
itself indicates, where the achievements and shortcomings of health care in treating them
as people with all the consequences thereof are most evident [10,11].
In Western philosophical thought, the principle of dignity has explicit historical
precedents since Antiquity, but this is not the case with vulnerability, which has been
formulated as such much more recently, not only in bioethics but also, as we shall see,
in anthropology and moral philosophy. And yet, one can also see how the fragile and
precarious character of dignity also tacitly appears from the first formulations.
“The idea of universal respect for the dignity of humanity in each and every person,
regardless of class, gender, race, and nation—an idea that has ever since been at the heart of
all distinguished political thought in the Western tradition—is, in origin, a Stoic idea” [12]
(p. 12). By establishing a clear distinction between humans and animals, Stoicism considers
that it is “(t)he presence of reason in any creature entitles it to respect from others, and also
from itself” [12] (p. 325).
Lucius A. Seneca believes that the consideration of the supreme and unique value of
virtue, its autarky and self-sufficiency, is united with this dignity of every human being
through the primacy of reason since virtue is the only thing needed to live well and happily.
“Praise the quality in him which cannot be given or snatched away, that which is the
peculiar property of the man. Do you ask what this is? It is soul, and reason brought to
perfection in the soul. For man is a reasoning animal. Therefore, man’s highest good is
attained, if he has fullfilled the good for which nature designed him at birth. [ . . . ] To live
in accordance with his own nature” [13] (XLI, 7–9).
Martha C. Nussbaum (2008) has questioned this Stoic vision, pointing out two serious
problems. On the one hand, the Stoic vision of dignity is based on an extreme disjunction
of human rationality with respect to non-human animals, which completely devalues all
these elements (emotion, sensitivity, affections), that in human life connect with other living
beings. On the other hand, Stoic dignity seems to aspire to an invulnerable autarky, which
would lead it to disparage as “external goods” all those vital resources and supports that
are not the moral virtue itself [14].
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The Spanish philosopher María Zambrano, who spent a long time in exile after the
1936–1939 Spanish Civil War, points out that in Seneca this natural reason is not the
imperative reason but rather a helpless reason, whose dignity is charged with resignation,
because it is “the reason that is not differentiated from life, coinciding with it, and thus it
does not serve to explain it, nor to transcend it, much less to endure it. [ . . . ] Endure life.
Carry on with it with dignity. Dignity is the only opening for the Stoic, the closest thing to
personal freedom, but more moving in our eyes because it has no horizon; desperate dignity”.
Now, a “despair not closed to hope”, a resignation that “is neither a believing nor a not
believing”, but rather a “yielding, a yielding before death. [ . . . ] It is not wanting to alter
the order of the world for anything, however strange it may be; to look at oneself without
resentment, to have ceased to see and feel oneself as something that is. [ . . . ] It is a kind of
weakness before the cosmos; to be defeated by it without resentment” [15] (pp. 83–84).
This desperate stoic dignity can be seen in certain passages of Ad Lucilium Epistulae
morales, in which Seneca considers just how to take care of himself in old age and how to
face the perspective of the proximity of his own death. “Do not hear me with reluctance,
as if my statement applied directly to you, but weigh what I have to say. It is this: that I
shall not abandon old age, if old age preserves me intact for myself, and intact as regards
the better part of myself; but if old age begins to shatter my mind, and to pull its various
faculties to pieces, if it leaves me, not life, but only the breath of life, I shall rush out of a
house that is crumbling and tottering. I shall not avoid illness by seeking death, as long
as the illness is curable and does not impede my soul. I shall not lay violent hands upon
myself just because I am in pain; for death under such circumstances is defeat. But if I
find out that the pain must always be endured, I shall depart, not because of the pain, but
because it will be a hindrance to me as regards all my reasons for living. He who dies just
because he is in pain is a weakling, a coward; but he who lives merely to brave out this
pain, is a fool” [13] (LVIII, 35–36).
In the Renaissance humanism of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1486), human dignity
is linked to a capacity for self-determination that, although received by the creature from
the hands of their Creator, depends above all on their own free endeavor [16], from which
the best [17] or the worst may result. “The nature of all other creatures is defined and
restricted within laws which we have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such
restrictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace for
yourself the lineaments of your own nature [ . . . ]. We have made you a creature neither of
heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and
proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer. It will be in
your power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you will be able, through your
own decision, to rise again to the superior orders whose life is divine” [18] (pp. 7–8).
But perhaps the most extreme union of dignity and vulnerability is represented by
the paradoxical baroque thought of Blaise Pascal (1670), who continues to associate the
greatness (dignity) of the little human being, beset by all kinds of dangers in the universe,
to his thinking capacity, to his perceiving his own vulnerability: “Man is but a reed, the
most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm
itself to crush him. A vapor, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But, if the universe were to
crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he knows
that he dies, and the advantage which the universe has over him; the universe knows
nothing of this. All our dignity consists, then, in thought.” Pascal, Pensées, trans. William F.
Trotter [New York: Dutton, 1958], n. 347, p. 97, cit. in [19] (p. 318).
In philosophical terms, the concept of dignity that is at stake in the principle of respect
for people, as autonomous beings, which raised the bioethical declarations, was established
in an exemplary way in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant [20]. “Autonomy is
therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (Kant,
GMS, 2◦, Ak. IV, 436), [21] (p. 42), and therefore, of the respect for oneself and others, as
equally rational beings [16].
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Although, as the Barcelona Declaration pointed out, the notion of dignity is broader
than that of autonomy, the bond that unites both principles is so strong that they necessarily
appear and disappear together due to the fact that, as Kant’s argument emphasizes, neither
a dignity nor an autonomy that are ontological features of humanity are being referred to,
and nor are they even the inherent condition of a self that we find has already been given.
Autonomy is rather an arduous endeavor, a demanding task that has something heroic
in it since it consists of striving to choose the right thing always from the appreciation
and personal and direct contact with values (J. Ortega y Gasset). Hence, dignity, which is
based on this constitutive autonomy (J. Rawls), which is a construction of a lifetime, is not
simply a prerogative but a daily moral conquest in the face of inertia and the pressure of
the impositions of what is established [16].
The following passages from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals show in Kant
the internal relationship between the universal notion of humanity which exists in the
corporeal, situated, and concrete existences of each personal individuality and that of
dignity, as an expression of the unique condition of end in itself, of the human being as a
rational autonomous being.
“Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings
without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things
(Sachen) whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them
out as an end in itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a means, and
hence so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect)” (Kant, GMS, 2◦, Ak. IV, 428), [21]
(p. 37).
“What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; that
which, even without presupposing such a need, conforms with a certain taste . . . has a
fancy price; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be
an end in itself has not merely a relative value, that is, a price, but an inner value, that is,
dignity [ . . . ]. Morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which
alone has dignity” [21] (p. 42) cit. [20] (p. 334).
The reason for the dignity of each rational autonomous existence is, therefore, its
possible participation in a universal legislation, but if we ask ourselves about the what of
dignity, that is, dignified for what, then the answer is: worthy of equal respect from any
other human being for the simple fact of also being a free subject of morality. Being treated
as a value, as an end in itself, brings about a feeling of self-respect, which has nothing to
do with self-esteem, which would be a form of self-love, but only the recognition of being
co-members of a kingdom of ends in themselves, of a noumenon republic of free and equal
beings [16]. The supreme norm of morality is therefore expressed as follows: So act that you
use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as
an end, never merely as a means [21] (p. 38).
However, in the notion of humanity—which comes from the Stoic tradition, especially
Cicero—we also see the connection of dignity with vulnerability, with the consideration of
humanity in every human being towards themselves and all others as an end in itself [22]
(pp. 144–148). For in the notion of vulnerability it is possible to distinguish a broad sense
and a strict sense that can also be found in the ethics of Kant, as has been highlighted with
greater difficulty, especially in the aforementioned formulation of the moral imperative
referring to humanity, since the perfect and imperfect duties, respect towards oneself as
towards others, are a response both to this general vulnerable condition (broad sense) and
to the specific vulnerabilities of certain people and groups (strict sense) [23]. The perfect
duties to ourselves require us to always treat ourselves as ends and never just as means
because our condition of rational agents as well as corporeal beings is vulnerable to different
ways of abusing ourselves and lacking our own self-respect. Faced with the appeal of a
duty to live, which, raised in legal terms from positions of the judiciary contrary to the
normative regulation of helping to die (with dignity), which might seem inspired by Kant,
it can be answered that “the right to life must be guaranteed by the political constitution,
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the duty to live on the other hand can only be based on a claim of the individual” [24]
(p. 169).
As Oliver Sensen has pointed out, “Kant uses a fundamentally Stoic conception of
dignity”. Certain passages in his work indicate that he adhered elements of what Sensen
calls a traditional conception of dignity: (i) dignity refers to an elevation rather than a
value per se; (ii) dignity allows for two stages: an initial and a fully realized conception of
dignity; (iii) he connects dignity with duties, not in the first instance with rights, and (iv)
he uses ‘dignity’ primarily in reference to duties towards self [25], (pp. 142, 165). So Kant
shows, when facing the possibility of death by oneself, a strict and almost rigid coherence
with the primacy of unconditional respect for dignity, humanity as autonomy in others
and of course in oneself, such that he completely discards the possibility that Seneca left
open to leave this world by his own hand in certain circumstances [21] (pp. 31–32, 38).
In Metaphysics of Morals [II, I, 1, 1, § 5–6], Kant adds that the Stoic’s wisdom, his courage,
and his greatness of mind not to fear death and to reject all the sensible motives of his
conduct should be used specifically to avoid any temptation to destroy himself, an object
of the utmost respect. It should be noted, as has been above, that this living by mere duty
only makes sense, in any case, as a personal free choice, not as an imposition of the law.
Autonomy, insofar as it is socially constructed, through the exercise of competencies
and abilities that are intersubjectively gestated, is directly exposed to certain vulnerabili-
ties [26], and dignity is also a relational notion. This fundamentally relational conception of
dignity, which shows the intertwining with vulnerability, appears in Sarah Clark Miller [27]
when she considers how to understand dignity as a principle of social intervention, from
the perspective of the ethics of care. She distinguishes two concepts of dignity: (i) a perfor-
mative dignity, such as “a quality that can be acknowledged through how others treat us
morally and also through how we treat ourselves”, which translates into an intervention
model that, in contrast to the predominant Kantian conception of respect, understands
care also as dignifying, as “an attitudinal recognition of another’s dignity, but one that
encourages the action of the carer stepping in to support the life plans of the one for whom
they are caring”; and (ii) a status dignity, “as unearned, intrinsic moral worth”, from which
two possible models of social intervention from care are proposed: one in which this is
conceived as “a distinctive moral power”, “the distinctive capacity that humans have
to perceive, understand, adopt, and advance another person’s self-determined ends as
their own”, and another in which dignity is conceived as fundamentally relational, while
“care ethics is focused on the significance of relationships and the relational for our moral
lives”, as highlighted by Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Sarah Rudick, Eva Feder Kittay,
and Virginia Held, among others [27] (pp. 112–120). This approach that it is proposed for
social intervention can be perfectly applied to the field of healthcare and in particular of
end-of-life-care.
A differentiation between more “individualistic”, more “relational-solidarity”, or
more “secular” approaches to dignity has also been proposed to demonstrate, through
research on bioethics publications in moral theology journals, that “the concept of dignity,
as most of the concepts used by the science or the humanities, is not a static entity that
remains identical through time and is not unanimously understood by scholars even within
one domain” [28]. Michela Marzano [29] has also already made a detailed differentiation
between a more individualistic and liberal version of autonomy in the utilitarian John
Stuart Mill and the more intersubjective and egalitarian version of Kantian deontologism.
If we now recall the explanation offered above about the close link between the principles
of autonomy and dignity, which Kant proposed, we will agree that a more relational
conception of dignity, that allows us to better recognize its intertwining with vulnerability,
will have as a background precisely a concept of autonomy that is also more intersubjective
and relational. To sum up, the conceptual constellation that includes the interweaving of
autonomy and dignity, vulnerability and interdependencies is shown as the most propitious
theoretical framework to address both empirical research and thinking on clinical dilemmas
in end-of-life care.
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4. Vulnerable with Dignity, towards a Paradoxical and Relational Autonomy
Vulnerable comes from the Latin term vulnus, wound; therefore, being vulnerable has
a wide range of meanings, linked to the susceptibility of beings, bodies, and existences; to
being injured, to being damaged, or one or the other. The notion of vulnerability, much
more recent than that of dignity, in moral philosophy, social theory and bioethics, is equally
highly polysemic and complex. Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds (2014) have proposed a tax-
onomy of vulnerability, according to which, depending on the source of the vulnerability, it
is possible to differentiate between: “Inherent vulnerability refers to sources of vulnerability
that are intrinsic to the human condition”; a situational vulnerability, which depends on
different personal, social, economic and environmental contexts, which make people or
groups vulnerable. “Both inherent and situational vulnerability may be dispositional or
occurrent. While the inherent–situational distinction refers to sources of vulnerability, the
dispositional–occurrent distinction refers to states of potential versus actual vulnerability”.
Finally, they propose a subtype of vulnerabilities: pathogenic vulnerabilities. “These may
be generated by a variety of sources, including morally dysfunctional or abusive inter-
personal and social relationships and sociopolitical oppression or injustice. Pathogenic
vulnerabilities may also arise when a response intended to ameliorate vulnerability has
the paradoxical effect of exacerbating existing vulnerabilities or generating new ones” [4],
(pp. 7–9).
However, just as we recognized vulnerability to be inherent in dignity and autonomy,
in the very core of vulnerability we find autonomy and dignity, thus, “the principle of
‘respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity’ should preferably be linked to
that of ‘human dignity’, which reinforces the statement of the unconditioned value of the
human beings by demanding his inviolability” [6], (pp. 161–162).
The following should also be stated: “taking ontological vulnerability seriously re-
quires us to rethink, rather than discard, the concept of autonomy. If human persons
are both ontologically vulnerable but also autonomous agents, then we need an account
of autonomy that is premised on recognition of human vulnerability and an analysis of
vulnerability that explains why we have obligations not only to protect vulnerable persons
from harm but also to do so in ways that promote, whenever possible, their capacities for
autonomy” [4] (p. 16).
From the point of view of vulnerability, it can be recognized that the dignity and
autonomy towards which one aspires are inevitably paradoxical and relational in nature.
Therefore, between a conception of the autonomy of rationality (Kant) and autonomy as
self-determination or absolute independence of the individual in J. S. Mill’s liberalism, it is
necessary to point to a third way, that of attention to capabilities. Through this, respect for
the dignity of the person goes beyond acquiescence to self-determination and beyond the
consideration of reason alone, and includes taking into account their history, relationships,
capacities and difficulties to plan and carry out their projects, in short, their capacities and
their vulnerability [30] (pp. 23–24).
For Emmanuel Levinas, the first author who philosophically addresses vulnerabil-
ity [6], (p. 157), “The Self, from head to feet, to the bone marrow, is vulnerability”, consti-
tutively the self is openness to the appeal of the Other. “Thus, in the vulnerability lies a
relation to the other that is not exhausted by causality, a relation prior to all affection by the
stimulus.” Vulnerability even implies an obsession with the other, with an approximation
of the other, which is not reduced to the representation that the self makes of the other, nor
to the awareness of their proximity [31] (pp. 62–65). When one suffers or cares for another,
when one loves or hates the other, when ones places oneself in the place of another, this
occurs from a responsibility that, it can be said, the self has never actively assumed but is
rooted in a previous vulnerability, a “mercy”, a “commotion in the entrails”, which antici-
pates the responsibility that I have not assumed at any time, in any present moment” [31].
This responsibility, rooted in the vulnerability of an interdependent corporeal self, is what,
together with Bernhard Waldenfels, we may call responsiveness [32].
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5. Dignity and Vulnerability, an Ethical-Existential Chiasma
Article 8 of the UNESCO Declaration of 2005 states precisely that “the principle of
respect for human vulnerability and personal integrity demands a new conception of the
human body and disease: a body is no longer an object but a subject and hence inseparable
from the person it comprises; a disease is not a purely objective phenomenon but only
gains reality in a lived body and significance in the history of a life” [6] (p. 163).
The intersection that has been shown in the previous sections between dignity and vul-
nerability as (bio) ethical principles is based on the particular interweaving of these two di-
mensions of human, corporeal, social and practical existences, which would make manifest
a more radical intertwining, which may be called existential. Maurice Merleau-Ponty [33]
takes from anatomy the term chiasma (χίασµα, ατoς, in ancient Greek, which means ‘cross
arrangement’, like the letter χ) to express the peculiarity of the ‘lived body’, of a corporeal
existence, which it is both sentient and sensible. The intersection of both principles (to be
vulnerable and to be dignified) on the ethical-social-political and anthropological-existential
levels is rooted in this chiasmatic character of the body. In addition, a certain trope or
rhetorical figure is called chiasmus, which here occurs at the intersection of meanings
present in the requirement to think both of a vulnerable dignity and a dignified vulnerability.
Dignity, which Pico della Mirandola associated with the capacity of a being, susceptible
of becoming by choice one of the most negligible or one of the most sublime creatures,
and linked by Immanuel Kant with value without equivalence, but equal to every rational-
sensible being that takes for itself the norm of its action (autonomy), can also only be
understood as human dignity when it is linked to the possibility of being denied, damaged
or not recognized. This refers to an intrinsic vulnerability and interdependence with the
human condition, in need of attention, care and response to otherness, as well as to
more concrete social vulnerabilities of certain groups, populations, or, especially, difficult
living conditions.
For its part, vulnerability can be thought of as an ethical principle and not as a mere
condition of anthropological fragility when it is seen as a dimension of an existence capable
of speaking/for itself, acting/for itself, and doing/for itself in dialogue, interaction and
conflict with others, when it is transcended by the awareness of the real value of someone
who is in the world, and is exposed to the world, as an agent, a co-protagonist of lives,
which are intermingled in a web of stories, woven with strong ties, but always delicate
and fragile.
It is due to the peculiarities of human bodily and social existence that dignity and
vulnerability permeate and interpenetrate each other, in a way that is even more inseparable
and indiscernible. What Paul Ricoeur has already pointed out regarding the double
condition of the human being both autonomous and vulnerable could also be mentioned.
On the one hand, it is the autonomy of a fragile, vulnerable being, on the other hand,
fragility would not be more than a pathology, if it were not the fragility of a being called to
be autonomous, because it has always been so in a certain way [34].
More than a moral principle in itself, vulnerability, as a dimension of the human
condition that appeals to the attention to and care for oneself and for others, is at the very
root of ethics [35,36], although it is at the intersection of dignity and vulnerability, this
existential chiasma of the jointly vulnerable and autonomous human condition, where the
dual active and long-suffering condition of moral subjects is best highlighted.
6. Conclusions
The theoretical framework of the intertwining of the bioethical principles of dignity
and vulnerability in corporality that has been presented here may frame research that
deals with respect for these principles in the practice of health care, from the perception of
health personnel, patients and relatives. We shall analyze some studies by way of example.
Approaching empirical investigations on moral questions which use the methods of the
human and social sciences to elucidate ethical issues may not be justified when it comes to
pure normative ethics, but this makes perfect sense when it comes to bioethics due to the
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eminently practical and specific nature of this area, which requires one to tread the terrain of
difficult decisions in research and healthcare. From the empirical studies of health and care
issues in the social and human sciences, it is possible to say what has been demonstrated in
terms of the role of empirical moral psychology in bioethics, that is, that “[it] can improve
bioethicists’ understanding of (1) the decision situation, (2) the origin and legitimacy of
their moral concepts, (3) efficient options for implementing (legitimate) decisions, and (4)
how to change and improve some parts of their moral framework” [37] (p. 36). With the
help of this type of study, a radical revision of frameworks of moral concepts in bioethics
can be carried out, through “actual-state, genealogical, and forward-looking analysis as
well as restricted normative revision in bioethics” [37] (p. 51).
In this study on the intertwining of dignity and vulnerability as principles of bioethics,
the allusion to empirical research takes on both the function of serving as an initial contrast
between the relevance of the conceptual analyses that are made, as well as helping to
highlight those lines of the study that seem most useful and applicable in order to under-
stand and illuminate the experience of patients, relatives and professionals in health care,
particularly in end-of-life care. The study has emphasized certain elements of analysis that
help to outline a theoretical framework for future research, as well as lines of thought for a
better understanding of complex health care situations in which decisions have to be made.
Human rights and public health lawyer Jonathan Mann [38] identified up to four main
ways in which dignity runs the risk of feeling it has been made vulnerable in healthcare
contexts, namely: a. Not being seen; b. Being seen, but only as a member of a group; c. Violations of
the bodily space; d. Humiliation [10] (p. 972). Likewise, in more specific recent research on the
preservation or the loss of dignity in end-of-life care in hospital emergency services [39,40],
the testimonies of the participants in the study highlight the importance of contact, at least
visual, between staff and patients as a sign that treatment is being received in accordance
with the dignity of the person, as well as listening and empathic communication, while
respecting the privacy of patients. Similarly, the professionals underline the lack of or need
for time to devote not only to the most technical aspects of care but also to make it easier
for patients receiving their care to feel accompanied and comfortable in their final moments
of life [39] (pp. 24–26). On the other hand, the loss of dignity is associated with structural
situations of the institution or the hospital department, lack of space and time, which
can desensitize the healthcare worker when dealing with their patients. As some nurses
participating in one of the studies stated: “Most of the time, we work without stopping,
with no time to see, with no time to listen and under enough stress to make us blind to
sensitivity” [40] (p. 235). “[The patient loses his/her dignity] when they stop being seen as
a person in the final hours of their life, and they’re treated like a laboratory parameter that
has to be improved according to repeated analytical extractions and aggressive techniques”.
Taking into account the intersection between dignity and vulnerability would help to
face difficult situations that sometimes lead to paradoxical decisions with greater serenity,
as highlighted by a number of studies on end-of-life care in the emergency department.
Physicians show how very often the fear of families to be “alone” face to face, with the
very final moments of the life of a relative, without all the hospital apparatus of personal
and technical resources, coupled with a certain stubborn social mentality of the “hospital
rescue”, leads to many people, even against their own will, ending their days trapped in
the least conducive context for the respect for their dignity in death and feeling that they
are a hindrance to those closest to them. “The family decides to take the patient to hospital,
subjecting them to unnecessary tests and examinations which satisfy the popular belief that
you can always do more. This means that these patients die alone, in an unfamiliar, cold,
impersonal environment, where techniques take precedence over care and comfort” [40]
(p. 237).
Knowing how to accompany those who are closest to us in the trance of dying, a
fundamental part of caring for a worthy end of life, implies recognizing oneself sharing the
feeling of the extreme vulnerability of those who see their own end near and breaking this
infernal circle that some nurses identify in people they have cared for. They feel that they
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lose their dignity “[w]hen they show distress because of needing others to help them with
their basic needs (going to the toilet, eating, etc.)” and, therefore, “[t]he patients don’t talk
about how they’re feeling, I think hardly any do. They don’t want to make their loved ones
even more upset” [40] (p. 237). The patient feels the vulnerability of their family members
to the suffering and pain of their situation, but a wrong conception of dignity, which would
exclude showing fragility, would prevent both the parent and their families from showing
the necessary recognition of this common condition, and doing this would be of great help
to everyone.
There are palliative care patients who are brought by the family to the emergency
department because they feel overwhelmed and unable to cope with end-of-life symptoms.
For this reason, some health professionals consider care that focuses on family members
rather than on the dying patient. (Díaz-Cortés et al. 2018) [39] (pp. 26–27). In this context,
it may be useful to remember that respect for the dignity of beings who know that they
are and feel mortal is based on a notion of autonomy that recognizes the vulnerability in
common and shared between those who care and those who are cared for so that the care
of vulnerable beings does not result in obsessive attention or become an occasion for the
imposition of paternalistic decisions.
A study with healthcare personnel [41] brought together various ways in which
healthcare professionals can improve their patients’ perception of the respect for their
dignity. Among others the following are mentioned: “presence” (keeping others company);
“concealment” (covering up embarrassing markers of illness); “independence” (facilitat-
ing, as far as possible, patient’s self-sufficiency and moral agency); levelling (minimizing
asymmetry); “creativity” (allowing patients to make or share art); “courtesy” (demonstrat-
ing common respect); and “authenticity” (honoring individuality and personhood) [10]
(p. 972).
In the study by Bovero et al. (2020) on the definition and maintenance of dignity in
patients at the end of life, the responses to the question addressed to health professionals
“What comes to your mind when I say ‘Dignity’ in relation to your patients?” were organized
around the following nine items: a. “Acceptance/Listening/Attention”; b. “Respect
for the person as a whole”; c. “Self-determination/Self-expression”; d. “Quality of Life
(QoL)/Symptom control/Self-sufficiency”; e. “Respect for the patient’s will/wishes/needs”;
f. “Privacy”; g. “Maintaining affective and social relationships”; h. “Ways of communi-
cation”; i. “Body/Care/Touch” [42]. Some of these items clearly show how expectations
more related to autonomy as the nucleus of dignity (b, c, e) are mixed with those more
typical of the corporeal, fragile, and vulnerable condition of patients (a, g, i).
Finally, both the studies that identify risks and losses of respect for dignity and the
proposals for improving respect for dignity show that the perception of dignity is rooted in
the vulnerability of bodily beings. To sum up, in care at the end of life, in coping with dying,
as a limit situation of one’s own capacities to speak/for oneself, act/for oneself, and do/for
oneself, in the face of the definitive threat to human frailty, which causes resentment for the
whole network of interdependencies and care, the intertwining of a dignified vulnerability
with a vulnerable dignity takes on a particular need to be taken into account. Talking about a
dignified death is inseparable from thinking about the unavoidable experience of extreme
existential and social vulnerability. A vulnerability, multiplied by the awareness of one’s
own end, by knowing that the finiteness of existence is reaching its fulfillment in me, so that,
rather than simply abandoning oneself and giving oneself entirely to the care of others, one
can still rise up with pride and take upon oneself the supreme destiny with decisiveness,
or anyway, expect the utmost respect for one’s last wishes or last words.
The foregoing considerations may therefore serve as an illustrative example that the
clarification of the intertwining of the bioethical principles of dignity and vulnerability that
is addressed here, in addition to contributing to the outline of a theoretical framework for
empirical research in healthcare, can provide inspiration and ideas for decision-making
and the action of patients, families and professionals in the different health care contexts,
particularly in end-of-life care.
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